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The commentary by Baillargeon, Buttelmann and Southgate raises a number of crucial issues 
concerning the replicability and validity of measures of false belief in infancy. Although we agree with 
some of their arguments, we believe that they underestimate the replication crisis in this area. In our 
response to their commentary, we first analyze the current empirical situation. The upshot is that, 
given the available evidence, it remains very much an open question whether infants possess a rich 
theory of mind. We then draw out more general conclusions for future collaborative studies that have 
the potential to address this open question. 
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1. Introductory remarks 
Infant Theory of Mind (ToM) has been one of the hottest topic in developmental cognitive science 
for over a decade. Among the main reasons for this prominence has been a set of striking new findings 
based on ingenious non-explicit measures. They suggested a more precocious ToM (a meta-
representational grasp of “belief” and other propositional attitude concepts) than previously assumed, 
questioned traditional dogma, and presented what may be the most impressive evidence for a rich, 
perhaps innate conceptual sophistication postulated in the nativist tradition. Currently, infant ToM 
research may be among the most hotly debated areas in developmental cognitive science because of 
a dawning replication crisis concerning this very evidence.  
We –many of the authors of the (non-)replication studies published in the special issue—would 
like to thank the editors, Mark Sabbagh and Markus Paulus, for moving the field forward by bringing 
together, in a special issue of Cognitive Development, hitherto unpublished replication studies. We 
would like to thank Renée Baillargeon, David Buttelmann and Victoria Southgate (henceforth BBS) for 
their insightful commentary that pinpoints many critical issues and raises important questions for 
future research. 
Here, we would like to take advantage of the opportunity to comment on their commentary in 
order to add some clarifications (and correct some minor mistakes) with regard to some of their 
arguments, as well as to complement their conclusions. We aim to offer a broader perspective on what 
we consider not just a set of anomalous findings but a serious replication crisis in infant ToM research, 
and draw out implications for future joint endeavors at collectively finding out the nature of infants’ 
precocious socio-cognitive skills.  
To foreshadow the general thrust of our comment: the current empirical situation in our field, 
exemplified by the papers in the special issue, is so serious that talking of a “replication crisis” is by no 
means exaggerated. In light of similar trends in other areas of psychology (e.g., Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015) a much more skeptical stance is warranted than acknowledged by BBS. Although 
there is now a large number of confirmatory published findings from a wide range of research 
paradigms, the bulk of the data has been collected from only a handful of labs. In addition, and more 
importantly, for all measures with positive findings in the original studies there is now a growing body 
of independent non-replications. Furthermore, from the replication crisis in other areas of psychology, 
and from the growing Open Science awareness, we have learned about the impact of publication bias, 
and file-drawer problems that should caution us against uncritically taking original findings at face 
value and remind us of the possibility of false positives (e.g., Simmons et al., 2011).  
To avoid misunderstanding right away, we are not claiming that the original findings are false 
positives (and that recent non-replications are true negatives). What we are suggesting is that the 
original findings might be false positives and that there is no sound justification to give them priority 
over later replication failures. Although prior in temporal order they are by no means more valid than 
the present results and one cannot conclude that the latter must therefore be false negatives (a line 
of reasoning the commentary seems to imply at places). Rather, all current evidence considered, it 
remains an open question whether infants do operate with a (perhaps implicit) full-blown theory of 
mind. The only way to find out is for all of us researchers in the field to move from post-hoc 
speculations about existing incompatible findings to systematic investigation motivated by and 
designed on a priori grounds, by joining our efforts to conduct a large-scale and systematic 
collaborative inquiry. 
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The structure of our comment is as follows: in three sections (2.1-2.3.) corresponding to the three 
main types of measures – violation of expectation (VoE), interaction, anticipatory looking (AL)- we 
respond to specific comments made by BBS in their respective sections and add clarifications and 
corrections (detailed responses to more specific or technical issues regarding individual replication 
studies are to be found in separate Appendices). Then, in the final part (section 3), we draw out more 
general issues that we believe apply to the field as a whole, identifying central questions and directions 
for future collaborative studies. 
 
2. Clarifications and responses regarding the different measures 
2.1 Violation-of-expectation tasks 
In 2005, a landmark study that changed the view on theory of mind development suggested that 
infants as young as 15 months understand false belief (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). This discovery was 
made by minimizing task demands, tapping into infants’ looking patterns with the well-established 
violation of expectation (VoE) procedure. As pointed out by BBS, almost two decades later, there are 
over 30 published papers providing evidence for false belief understanding in children ages 6-36 
months (Scott & Baillargeon, 2017). However, it is particularly unfortunate that in the case of the 
violation of expectation paradigm, out of 15 publications on false belief, 11 (73%) have been conducted 
by Baillargeon and her former students. This is obviously a less than desirable situation for the 
attainment of reliable cumulative knowledge. An additional problem is that these studies differed 
massively in all kinds of parameters, such as end-of-trial criteria, that ideally should be determined 
consistently and transparently in a priori ways – complicating the interpretability of the findings 
(Rubio-Fernandez, in press). Furthermore, although there is clearly a large set of studies that suggest 
that infants possess a mature concept of false belief that is revealed when task demands are reduced, 
it is also important to point out that there is evidence for a publication bias on this topic.  Not all studies 
have found that infants have false belief understanding but, as one would expect, many of these 
studies have not been published. A subset of these null results is now published in a CD special issue 
and many others are mentioned in a recently published survey (Kulke & Rakozy, 2017). How should 
such non-replications be interpreted? In their commentary, BBS argue that the absence of VoE 
replications reported in the special issue are mainly due to methodological flaws.  
Familiarization procedure 
One of the methodological issues raised by BBS is that the authors of most failed replications 
changed elements of the original familiarization phase in ways that prevented infants from fully 
forming an expectation about the intentions of the agent (e.g., switching the box where she hides the 
toy across familiarization trials, or adding a blindfold on last trial). First, however, we note that there 
is no a priori explanation for why the original familiarization procedure (and only the original one) led 
to the formation of an expectation about the agent’s intention, and why other procedures should not. 
Second, what BBS failed to discuss is that some of the successful replications among the 15 positive 
VoE findings they refer to have also introduced changes in the familiarization phase relative to the 
original procedure used by Onishi and Baillargeon.  These include changes similar to those that BBS 
argue may account for null findings (e.g. familiarization events in Träuble et al., 2010 involved the 
object being placed in and transferred between each of the two hiding locations in an alternating 
pattern). If indeed changes in the familiarization procedure jeopardize task validity, does this mean 
that those findings may be false positives? It is also important to note that some of the changes that 
yielded negative findings were motivated by the need to provide more stringent tests of false belief 
(e.g., ensuring that reaches depicted during familiarization did not match only the expected and not 
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the unexpected test trial, as in Onishi and Baillargeon FB-Green, and many subsequent replications). 
Generally, in the absence of a sound basis for predicting a priori a functioning familiarization 
procedure, and without independent assessment of its working, there is no strong reason to believe 
that differences in outcome are a product of familiarization differences, rather than typical statistical 
variability around the true effect size.  
 
Interference and order effects? 
Another methodological change that BBS think might explain recent non replications is potential 
interference and order effects. It is true that studies that have tested infants on a battery of tasks have 
tended to generate null results. However, the tasks were, as one would expect, counterbalanced, and, 
more importantly, no order effects were reported. It is rather ironic that in the study frequently cited 
by BBS as a strict successful replication of the original experiment (Yott & Poulin-Dubois, 2012), the 
false belief task was always administered after a rule training task where the infant were trained to 
expect that the object was never at the last place they saw it. As for carry-over effects through multiple 
test sessions, the only study that examined this effect showed that infants do not attribute true beliefs 
to an agent who was previously showing misleading emotional cues (Chow & Poulin-Dubois, 2009). 
This is a potentially fruitful research line to investigate in future studies.  
 
Duration of the test phase & re-analyses 
Concerning the null results by Dörrenberg et al. (2018) BBS argue that test trial duration may be 
the critical factor to explain the failed replication. In Dörrenberg et al. (2018), the duration of the test 
trial was fixed, not infant-controlled as in the original experiment in which the test trial ended when 
children looked away for two consecutive seconds. We agree with BBS that when test trials are too 
long, any condition differences will dissipate. However, the length of Dörrenberg et al.’s outcome 
phase was not a randomly chosen, overly long time interval. Instead, it was based on a literature review 
showing that infants typically attend in a still phase between 15 to 25 seconds before they look away 
for two consecutive seconds (see e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon 2005). Arguably, the cumulative looking 
time as provided by an eye-tracker might even be more accurate as a cognitive measure of attention 
than the latency to look away for two consecutive seconds as determined by live hand coding.    
BBS report a re-analysis of the Dörrenberg et al. data in which they chose (arbitrarily) the first 10 
seconds of the still-phase test time. This re-analysis reveals looking time patterns compatible with 
belief-tracking in the FB condition. However, apart from the problematic approach of the post-hoc, 
data-driven decision for the time window (based on “initial inspection”), the data Dörrenberg et al. 
provided showed that at least more than half of the children had not yet looked away for more than 2 
seconds after the first 10 seconds of the still-phase, thus rendering it an invalid analysis by Baillargeon’s 
own standard. In addition, BBS’s re-analysis only presents half of the picture because it does not report 
the corresponding re-analysis for the TB condition. Looking time data in the FB condition can only be 
conclusively interpreted in conjunction and contrast with TB conditions. Interestingly, the same re-
analysis as performed by BBS on the TB condition reveals that children’s looking time at the 
unexpected event was not different from looking time at the expected event, with only 14/26 (54%) 
children looking longer at the unexpected event (for details, see the Appendix A). Thus, FB and TB 
conditions taken together do not constitute conclusive evidence for belief-tracking in the more limited 
10 sec time window either. Curiously, BBS did not re-analyze the actually much more important 
replication analysis of performance on the first trial, between-subjects. Dörrenberg et al. used the 
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suggested 10 seconds time window and found no differences between congruent and incongruent 
belief-based action processing for FB and TB conditions (for details, see the Appendix A).  
 
Validation of task analysis with adults 
Finally, in response to Low and Edwards’ (2018) contribution, BBS question the general strategy 
of validating controversial infant task analyses with adults. They argue that adults’ responses to a given 
task may be quite irrelevant for determining what such a task taps in infants; tasks that are suitable 
for infants may simply not be suitable for adults. We respectfully disagree about this general line of 
argumentation in two respects (for details, see Appendix B). First, we disagree about the necessity of 
independent validation of task analyses. If we want to know what a given task measures we do need 
validation for any tasks analyses proposed. In many cases, such as standard FB tasks, this is trivial since 
the task analysis in terms of theory of mind reasoning is rather obvious. However, in cases where the 
task analysis offered by the authors is disputable (anecdotally, many of us and our students did not 
find Scott and Baillargeon’s (2009) task analysis obvious or compelling at all), it is unclear what a task 
taps in the absence of an independent validation of the task analysis. The most obvious independent 
validation of Scott and Baillargeon’s study is to ask adults or older children to describe what is 
happening in each scenario —as Low and Edwards did. Other possibilities would be to test convergent 
validation: Does performance in this task converge and correlate with performance in other FB tasks 
with less controversial task analyses? Second, we disagree about the lack of usefulness of testing adults 
with paradigms from infant studies more generally. Cognitive-developmental scientists have found it 
useful to gather converging data across different age groups and populations because similarities 
and/or differences in response profiles that persist despite differences in experiences can shed light 
how tasks are being interpreted and, further, help characterize diverse mental models of the 
psychological and physical worlds that influence human beings’ attention and action (e.g., Dixson, 
Komugabe-Dixson, Dixson, & Low, 2017; Hinten, Labuschagne, Boden, & Scarf, 2018; Kovács, Téglás, 
& Endress, 2010; Xu, Carey, & Welch, 1999). Low and Edwards’ findings are therefore relevant: even 
amongst adults who did interpret the belief-congruent of Scott and Baillargeon’s (2009) study outcome 
as being expected, the explanations revolved around the agent making a decision based on the types 
of object present (penguin or grapefruit) rather than on object identity in the strict numerical sense. 
The findings give researchers a starting point for delineating infants’ processing of the psychological 
world that could support tracking false-beliefs in a limited but useful range of situations. 
 
Conclusion 
Taken together, the current set of findings reported on VoE experiments on infant’s FB understanding 
is complex and confusing. So far, independent replication attempts have largely yielded null findings, 
and exceptions are difficult to interpret: First, Yott and Poulin-Dubois (2012) did reproduce the original 
effects, but only after a rule training phase. Second, and quite ironically, a recent replication study with 
an analogous scenario as Onishi & Baillargeon’s, approved by Renée Baillargeon ( personal 
communication, October 2017) generated a “replication” in the sense that children produced the same 
pattern of looking times (Burnside, Severdija & Poulin-Dubois, 2018). Crucially, however, the scenarios 
differed from the original ones in that the human protagonist was replaced by a toy crane with minimal 
animacy properties. Since intuitively toy cranes are not holders of beliefs or other mental states (and 
indeed, adult participants in the study did no ascribe any such states to the crane), this suggests that 
the looking pattern in this and previous studies may not reflect belief ascription at all but rather some 
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simpler sub-mentalizing processes (alternatively, it may be that infants do operate with a concept of 
“belief” but initially ascribe this concept much more widely, in a sort of promiscuous” over-
mentalizing”). 
 Taken together, it thus remains unclear whether there is compelling evidence from VoE tasks 
for early belief ascription.  More conceptual replications are needed with infants that clearly highlight 
the rationale for the methodological choices that are made by the researchers, including addressing 
potential confounds of the design, like Powell et al. (2018). Importantly, in such studies design 
decisions need to be made (and pre-registered) a priori in clear, theoretically motivated, and consistent 
ways. This will help to address yet another problem in interpreting published positive findings due to 
the fact (mentioned above) that the studies in question differed in various parameters such as end-of-
trial criteria that ideally should be determined in a priori ways and kept constant across studies (Rubio-
Fernandez, in press). Concerning validity, both independent validation tests of the material and task 
analyses with older children and adults and convergent validation studies using within-subjects designs 
are required. The few studies published that tested FB understanding across paradigms (e.g., VoE vs 
Interactive) with a within-subject design have yielded null results (Dörrenberg et al, 2018; Poulin-
Dubois & Yott, 2017; Kulke et al, 2018; Powell et al, 2018).  
 
2.2. Interaction tasks 
Quite surprisingly, in their discussion of interactive measures BBS focus exclusively on one 
particular task by Buttelmann et al. (2009). This task has been the subject of a number of replication 
attempts, some of them unpublished (see Kulke & Rakoczy, 2017), some previously published (Fizke et 
al., 2017; Oktay-Gür et al., 2018; Poulin-Dubois & Yott, 2017), some published in the special issue 
(Crivello et al., 2018; Priewasser et al., 2018; Powell et al., 2018).   
 
Replicability of the Buttelmann et al. (2009) task 
Independent replication attempts so far have yielded partial replications or null results. Partial 
replication patterns in several studies reproduced a condition difference (children responded 
differently in a TB compared to a FB condition), but did not replicate the original above-chance 
performance within each condition (Fizke et al., 2017; Oktay-Gür et al., 2018; Priewasser et al., 2018). 
This is an interesting pattern since it is obviously ambiguous in terms of interpretation: it is compatible 
with (but provides no conclusive evidence for) belief-tracking; but it is equally compatible with much 
more parsimonious interpretations in terms of knowledge-ignorance distinction (rather than full-
blown belief reasoning).  
Null results were reported by Crivello and Poulin-Dubois (2018) in the special issue. To explain this 
lack of replication of the original experiment BBS argue that Crivello and Poulin-Dubois’s results are 
due to critical methodological changes. More specifically, the much shorter distance between the child 
and the boxes might have led infants to produce impulsive responses. It is true that the success rate 
improved when the distance was slightly increased across the two experiments (from 37% to 58%) but 
children still did not perform at above chance levels. Furthermore, only a small proportion of children 
touched both boxes simultaneously (a clear sign of impulsiveness) during the experimental trials. 
Regarding the attrition rate, having the child to walk toward the boxes yielded an exceptionally large 
attrition rate in the original experiment (54% when all children excluded are counted, 40% if those who 
helped with parental prompting are included). This very high attrition rate motivated Crivello and 
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Poulin-Dubois to administer the task at a table. On the other hand, having the child walk toward the 
boxes as in the original paradigm (Buttelmann et al., 2009) also brought some risks, such as a change 
of decision en route. This did in fact occur, but the frequency was not reported in the original paper 
(Buttelmann, personal communication, July 2014). Another issue raised by the authors of the 
commentary concerns lower statistical power whereas in fact, Crivello and Poulin-Dubois’ first 
experiment included a final sample size of 41 in the false-belief condition in contrast to 25 18-month-
olds in the false belief condition in the original study by Buttelmann et al. Yet another potential factor 
that may have masked mindreading capacities that BBS mention is affiliation with the agent (who 
administered other tasks). This interpretation, although intriguing, clashes with the well-known 
evidence that infants are more likely to help a familiar adult (Spinrad & Stifner, 2006), and is 
inconsistent with the absence of an order effect (more exposure to the adult should hinder 
performance). Finally, cross-cultural differences are very unlikely to account for the null results given 
that many helping tasks that require some form of mindreading (e.g., intention) originally reported on 
German populations, have been replicated across many countries. 
 
Validity of the Buttelmann et al. (2009) task 
In another contribution to the special issue, Priewasser et al. (2018) are concerned about the 
validity of the Buttelmann et al. (2009) task. Their main points are the following (for details, see 
Appendix C): Methodologically, the task suffers from confounds between TB and FB conditions. Most 
dramatically: The conditions do not only differ in epistemic respects (such that the agent knows about 
the object’s location in the TB condition, but holds a false belief in the FB condition), but also in 
motivational respects. For example, the agent expressed interest for the object throughout the FB 
condition, but witnessed in a detached manner the object’s transfer in the TB condition and may thus 
be taken to be less interested in the object on his return to the boxes. In a new 3-box version of the 
original study, Priewasser et al (2018) investigated whether some such factor other than the agent’s 
false belief may be responsible for the difference in helping behavior between conditions. In a new-FB 
condition the relevance of the agent’s false belief for explaining his behavior was neutralized (the agent 
attempting to open a neutral box). Yet the same difference in helping behavior emerged as in the 
original study. Since the agent’s false belief was irrelevant for understanding his intentions the 
difference in behavior must be based on some other factor. There is no obvious reason why the same 
factor would not also have been operative in the original study and thus the results strongly suggest 
that this factor—and not the agent’s false belief—is responsible for the difference in helping behavior 
in all versions. Important to note, this evidence against mentalism cannot be due to a false negative 
produced by the greater complexity of the 3- than the 2-box version, as intimated in the commentary. 
For, the 3-box version did show a very strong and reliable effect between conditions.  
At this point the results are strong evidence that in the helping paradigm by Buttelmann et al 
(2009) no understanding of belief need be involved. To contest this conclusion one needs to show that 
the switch from the 2-box to the 3-box version made children approach the task completely differently 




Interestingly, there is another interactive FB task that does not involve confounds between FB and 
TB conditions and is thus much more stringently interpretable than Buttelmann et al.’s task. This task 
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by Southgate et al. (2010) which, strangely enough, BBS ignored in their comment, has recently also 
been subject to replication attempts (one of them published in the special issue). These replication 
studies yielded consistently negative results and no evidence for convergent validation (Grosse 
Wiesmann et al., 2017; Supplement; Dörrenberg et al., 2018). So, taking the findings from these 
different types of tasks together, there is currently no robust evidence from interaction tasks for early 
belief ascription.  
 
2.3. Anticipatory looking tasks 
When it comes to the interpretation of non-replications, AL measures are special compared to 
VoE and interaction measures. Since they can be implemented with video-stimuli and eye-tracking 
systems in completely automated ways, strict replications can be realized by using the original stimuli 
and procedures. Such direct replications are particularly conclusive. They leave little (if any) room for 
attributing non-replication findings to procedural deviations from original methods. Many such direct 
replications have recently been conducted, four of them reported in the special issue (Burnside et al., 
2018; Dörrenberg et al., 2018; Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2018; Kulke et al., 2018a). Most of these direct 
replications, as well as less direct yet still very stringent conceptual replications converge in failing to 
replicate the original findings. 
Familiarization phase and inclusion rates  
The overview of the replicability of familiarization trials in Table 1 of BBS’s comment is very 
helpful. Unfortunately, however, it contains some factual mistakes: Most relevant for current 
purposes, 65% (33/51) rather than only 58% subjects (30/51) anticipated correctly in the second 
familiarization trial of Dörrenberg et al. (2018) – a rate much like in the original study1. Relatedly, BBS 
state that based on high exclusion rates due to failed familiarization trials, these replication studies are 
based on smaller sample sizes. It should be noted, however, that this is not the case, as the sample 
sizes, even after exclusion of subjects failing the familiarization, were considerably larger or identical 
to those tested by Southgate et al. (2007) in 9 out of the 12 replication studies summarized in Table 1 
in BBS’s commentary. 
More generally, it should be emphasized that the directness of replications of AL measures 
extends to the familiarization trials and inclusion criteria. Again, the very same stimuli and procedures 
as in original studies can be used – and have been used in the studies reported here. That is, whether 
familiarization performance matches that of original studies is itself a question of replicability. This is 
very different from designs in which different familiarizations are implemented or different inclusion 
criteria adopted. In the latter case, the informativeness of the results on the critical test trials may be 
a matter of justified dispute, for example, when inclusion criteria were different and questionable. In 
the present case, however, problematic inclusion rates do not put into question the appropriateness 
of the replication study, but the replicability and usefulness of original procedures. Conceptually, if the 
familiarization performance did indeed inform about intention-tracking behavior, participants who 
pass the familiarization criterion should also show improved performance in the test trial, at least in 
the TB condition that does not involve false belief processing but simple ascription of an intention to 
the agent. Empirically, however, several studies have reported statistical analyses showing that 
whether or not participants pass the familiarization did not significantly affect the results in the test 
trial (e.g. Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2018; Kulke et al., 2018a). Therefore, the most likely explanation for 
 
1 The other mistakes are: In Kulke et al. (2018a, Study 2b) 41/64 rather than 40/64 children passed the inclusion trials, in 
Kulke et al. (2018b) the correct number is 89/163 rather than 80/163 (the latter refer to those who passed ALL 
familiarization criteria of all four tasks). 
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unsuccessful familiarization trials is that the task is not very appropriate and suitable in general to 
induce action-anticipation and intention-tracking looking behavior. 
Put constructively and prospectively, one of the major challenges for future replication studies 
with AL measures will be to devise better familiarization methods that ensure that participants fully 
engage in spontaneous action anticipation that produce lower exclusion rates. 
 
The emerging picture  
Across many replication attempts, most of them with larger sample sizes than, and with comparable 
inclusion rates to the original studies, there is thus currently no conclusive evidence for robust 
replicability for infant ToM as measured with AL tasks (nor for spontaneous forms of ToM as measured 
by AL in adults; Kulke et al., 2018b): None of the replication studies of Southgate et al. (2007), for 
example, constitutes a full-replication2. Some fail to replicate any effects (Kulke et al., 2018a, Study 1, 
subsample of 2-year-olds; Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2018; Schuwerk et al., 20183). Many replicate only 
the effects observed in the ambiguous FB1 condition (that by itself is difficult to interpret since it is as 
compatible with belief-tracking as it is with simpler processes such as object-tracking; Kulke et al., 
2018a, Study 1, Study 2a); and of those some find chance performance in the less ambiguous FB2 
condition (Kulke et al., 2018a, Study 1, Study 2a), whereas others find below-chance performance 
(Kulke et al., 2018a, Study 2b). Yet other studies yield mixed results in FB1 but find the opposite effect 
from the original study (below-chance looking) in FB2 (Dörrenberg et al., 2018).  
As BBS note in their commentary, it may be particularly challenging to interpret these non-
replications given that they do not exemplify one consistent and overarching pattern. However, such 
complex and diverging patterns of findings are not only unproblematic; they are exactly what one 
would expect in cases of original false positive findings where the task may not tap what it was 
supposed to tap, where original findings reflect statistical fluctuations (rather than any systematic 
distortions) and happened to make it into print against the background of given file-drawer problems 
and publication biases. Again, we wish to emphasize that we are not suggesting that this is necessarily 
the case, but that the empirical pattern of (non-) replication results is highly compatible with such a 
possibility. 
All things considered, there is thus currently no robust and unambiguous evidence from AL tasks 
for an early rich ToM (belief ascription). In particular, there seems to be no AL task that is appropriate 
and sensitive regarding familiarization and inclusion, and that delivers replicable and valid evidence 
for infant belief attribution. The tasks reported in the special issue suffer from lack of 
appropriateness/sensitivity and do not robustly replicate. The one task that proved robustly replicable 
in a recent large-scale direct replication study with adults (the location condition of Low and Watts, 
2013) turned out to lack construct validity (effects disappeared once crucial confounds were controlled 
for; Kulke et al., 2018b, Study 3).  
Absence of evidence is, of course, no evidence of absence. The only way to move research forward 
in this area is to join forces and implement collaborative, large-scale, multi-lab conceptual replication 
studies of AL measures of infant belief ascription. Such projects will need to develop tasks that are 
appropriate and sensitive regarding familiarization and inclusion, and have compelling face-validity as 
 
2 With the possible exception of Wang & Leslie, 2016. This study replicated only one of the original conditions 
(FB1), however. And see also Schuwerk et al. (2018) for critical concerns about the analyses that do deviate 
considerably from the original ones. 
3 It should be noted, though, that only the FB2 condition of Southgate et al. (2007) was tested here. 
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conclusive indicators of ToM. With such tasks, the conceptual replicability of AL-effects can be probed 
on grounds that are theoretically and methodologically motivated in a priori ways. Such projects may 
need to address specific questions regarding the interpretation of ambiguous patterns of partial 
replications. For example, in the AL tasks modeled on Southgate et al. (2007) in which the target object 
is removed from the scene, how do we interpret certain patterns of results, for example, a replication 
of effects in the ambiguous FB1, but not in the less ambiguous FB2 condition (see Kulke et al., 2018a, 
Study 2a; or Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2018 in older children)? On the one hand, such a pattern could 
be evidence for belief-tracking that is masked by task complexity in FB2. On the other hand, it may 
reflect low-level cognitive processes such as object-tracking. Novel control conditions are required to 
tease these alternative interpretations apart. Similarly, in AL tasks that are more directly modeled on 
change-of-location scenarios (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) like those of Surian and Geraci (2012) or 
Schneider et al. (2011), how do we interpret patterns of results (found, for example, in adults in some 
studies of Kulke et al., 2018b) such that participants do anticipate differently in FB and TB conditions, 
but anticipate correctly only in TB while looking randomly in FB? Such a pattern could be evidence for 
belief-tracking (masked by inhibitory demands in FB), for merely tracking knowledge-ignorance, or for 
even simpler processes. Again, new control conditions are required to reach firm conclusions.  
 
3. Conclusion & Outlook 
In conclusion, we would like to thank BBS for their detailed commentary. We believe that it raises 
many interesting questions and issues, and we find ourselves in agreement with many of their 
suggestions regarding future directions.  
Looking now: A more skeptical stance 
As a friendly amendment to their analysis, however, we believe that a more skeptical stance than theirs 
is warranted in light of the current published and unpublished empirical evidence. The stance we are 
advocating is not skeptical in the sense of denying early rich ToM, but in the sense of considering it an 
open empirical question whether we have good reason to belief in such a thing. Neither should this 
stance be confused with a-theoretical, unconstrained merely empirical exploration. On the contrary, 
it is firmly theoretically grounded and motivated. The theoretical possibilities, ranging from a very rich 
nativist via intermediate conceptual change and dual-processing to parsimonious sub-mentalizing 
accounts are on the table and lay the basis for deriving clear and competing predictions.  One can test 
theories against each other without prior commitments (and thus the potential pitfalls of 
confirmations biases) to any one of them. And this is exactly the stance, we think, the current evidence 
warrants: Non-committed, yet theoretically motivated curiosity. On the basis of current evidence, we 
simply do not know (yet) whether the infant truly has a rich theory of mind.  
But are we over-reacting? Are the more than 30 papers with various methods and positive findings 
referred to by BBS not strong and conclusive evidence that infants indeed have a rich ToM? In our 
view, one of the lessons from the recent replication crisis in other areas of psychology and of the rise 
of Open Science awareness and practice is that it will not suffice as a compelling argument to simply 
mention the mere number of published positive findings. In the absence of more detailed and fine-
grained information, in particular about the diversity of labs sampled from, file-drawer problems (how 
many non-published negative findings match the published positive ones?) and thus potential 
publication biases, the number of published positive findings per se is of limited epistemic value (e.g. 
Ioannadis, 2005; Simmons et al., 2011). Not surprisingly, there is evidence for file-drawer problems 
and publication biases in infant ToM research (Kulke & Rakoczy, 2017), and researchers are now 
beginning to empty their file-drawers – the special issue being one example. 
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It will also not suffice as a compelling argument to mention that positive published findings come 
from studies with various dependent measures. Because for each of these measures for which there 
have been independent replication attempts, the largely negative results of the latter raise serious 
doubts about the replicability (and/or validity) of each of the former. For details regarding VoE, 
interaction and AL measures, see the sections above. Regarding priming and altercentric interference 
measures (which were not subject of any paper in the special issue), see, for example Conway et al. 
(2017) for doubts about replicability, and Santiesteban et al. (2014) and Phillips et al. (2015) for doubts 
about validity. 
Finally, it is premature to conclude that we have any convergent evidence, in a relevantly strong 
sense, for rich infant ToM (a claim made by BBS). In this context, it is essential to keep apart two notions 
of “convergent evidence”. According to a weaker notion, two independent studies both supposed to 
tap a similar phenomenon with similar findings constitute converging evidence. According to a 
stronger notion, though, convergent evidence requires cross-validation and thus intra-individual 
consistency (correlation) across various, superficially different, measures supposed to tap the same 
underlying phenomenon. Now, regarding explicit ToM, there is much converging evidence not only in 
the weak, but also in the strong sense: Across superficially very diverse tasks that all share a conceptual 
deep structure (all require meta-representation), performance converges and correlates (for an 
overview, see Perner & Roessler, 2012). With regard to research on infant ToM, in contrast, published 
positive findings only supply convergent evidence in the weak sense. The few studies that have tested 
for convergent evidence in the strong sense so far have all yielded negative findings (e.g., Dörrenberg 
et al., 2018; Kulke et al., 2018; Poulin-Dubois & Yott, 2017).  
 
Looking ahead: A constructive and collaborative stance 
All in all, we thus disagree with BBS about the seriousness of the replication crisis and its implications 
for the question of whether infants possess a rich ToM. Luckily, however, this disagreement is only a 
transient condition, and has the potential to stimulate collaboration and progress. We completely 
agree with BBS that it is important to speculate about potential differences between positive original 
and negative replication results (although we do not agree with BBS’s implicit assumption that, as a 
default, original findings enjoy more than merely temporal priority), and to do so in post-hoc ways. 
Well, how else should one do it now other than post-hoc? But “after-the-fact”, if one needs a slogan, 
is merely before the next study.  
Post-hoc speculations are potentially helpful as steps towards systematic empirical tests. These 
can and should be done in two ways. First, meta-analyses on existing published and unpublished 
findings can explore whether there is indeed evidence that a potential moderating factor speculated 
about (say, the familiarity of the experimenter) can explain the divergence between positive and 
negative findings. This approach was adopted in a recent meta-analysis on neonatal imitation that 
systematically tested for the potential role of many moderating factors that had been suggested in a 
long-standing debate (results failed to reveal any evidence for an influence of any of these factors; 
Slaughter, 2018). Second, the silver bullet clearly is large-scale, collaborative, pre-registered, multi-lab 
replication studies in which potential factors can be implemented as independent variables. 
Fortunately, such a large-scale collaborative replication project is currently in the planning stage under 
the umbrella of the ManyBabies framework (Frank et al., 2017) and includes many researchers in the 
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field as participating scientists, including BBS and us (and hopefully soon may more4). In several waves 
of this project (termed “ManyBabies2”), the replicability and validity of different measures of infant 
ToM such as VoE, AL and interactive measures will be investigated in concerted ways in dozens of labs 
around the world. In the AL wave, for example, currently in preparation, conceptual replication studies 
of various existing AL measures with varying complexity (Southgate et al., 2007, Surian & Geraci, 2012) 
will be implemented in a first step. Depending on the patterns of findings of these replication studies, 
in a second step there will then be follow-up validation and control studies in order to clarify which 
kind of implicit ToM processes, if any, these tasks tap. Given this procedure, and given that the project 
involves researchers that cover the whole ideological spectrum, ManyBabies2 goes way beyond mere 
replication research. By designing conceptual replication experiments approved by all participants – in 
a priori task analysis– as face-valid tests of infant ToM, and by implementing potential moderating 
factors as variables, the project opens new avenues of “adversarial collaboration” (Mellers, Hertwig & 
Kahnemann, 2001). Researchers who may hold different theoretical views about infants’ social-
cognitive repertoire devise empirical test cases the potential implications of which they agree about. 
In this way, theoretical disputes can be ideally resolved, in collaborative, rational and a priori ways that 
go way beyond the often unconstrained, unproductive and tiring back and forth between studies and 
defensive, counter post-hoc speculations from alternating sides.  
 
4 Researchers interested in participating are very welcome and should email the first authors. A more general 
call for participation will be issued over the relevant mailing lists once data collection for the replication studies 
is about to begin. 




Blakemore, S. J., Sarfati, Y., Bazin, N., & Decety, J. (2003). The detection of intentional contingencies in 
simple animations in patients with delusions of persecution. Psychological Medicine, 33(8), 
1433-1441. doi: 10.1017/s0033291703008341 
Buttelmann, D., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Eighteen-month-old infants show false belief 
understanding in an active helping paradigm. Cognition, 112(2), 337–342. 
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.05.006 
Burnside, K., Severdija, V., & Poulin-Dubois, D. (2018). Do infants attribute FB to a toy crane? 
Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Conway, J. R., Lee, D., Ojaghi, M., Catmur, C., & Bird, G. (2017). Submentalizing or mentalizing in a Level 
1 perspective-taking task: A cloak and goggles test. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 43(3), 454-465. doi: 10.1037/xhp0000319 
Crivello, C., & Poulin-Dubois, D. (2018). Infants’ false belief understanding: A non-replication of the 
helping task. Cognitive Development, 46, 51–57. doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2017.10.003 
Dixson, H.G.W., Komugabe-Dixson, A.F., Dixson, B.J., & Low, J. (2017). Scaling theory of mind in a small-
scale society: A case from Vanuatu. Child Development. Advanced online publication. 
doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12919 
Dörrenberg, S., Rakoczy, H., & Liszkowski, U. (2018). How (not) to measure infant Theory of Mind: 
Testing the replicability and validity of four non-verbal measures. Cognitive Development, 46, 12–
30. doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2018.01.001 
Grosse Wiesmann, C., Friederici, A. D., Singer, T., & Steinbeis, N. (2017). Implicit and explicit false belief 
development in preschool children. Developmental science, 20(5), e12445. 
doi:10.1111/desc.12445 
He, Z., Bolz, M., & Baillargeon, R. (2011). False-belief understanding in 2.5-year-olds: evidence from 
violation-of-expectation change-of-location and unexpected-contents tasks. Developmental 
Science, 14(2), 292–305. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2010.00980.x 
Fizke, E., Butterfill, S., van de Loo, L., Reindl, E., & Rakoczy, H. (2017). Are there signature limits in early 
theory of mind?. Journal of experimental child psychology, 162, 209–224. 
doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2017.05.005 
Frank, M. C., Bergelson, E., Bergmann, C., Cristia, A., Floccia, C., Gervain, J., ... & Lew-Williams, C. (2017). 
A collaborative approach to infant research: Promoting reproducibility, best practices, and 
theory-building. Infancy, 22(4), 421–435. doi:10.1111/infa.12182 
Frith, C. D. (2004). Schizophrenia and theory of mind. Psychological Medicine, 34(3), 385-389. doi: 
10.1017/s0033291703001326 
Hinten, A.E., Labuschagne, L.G., Boden, H., & Scarf, D. (2018). Preschool children and young adults' 
preferences and expectations for helpers and hinderers. Infant and Child Development. Advanced 
online publication. doi:10.1002/icd.2093 
Ioannidis, J. P. A. (2005). Why Most Published Research Findings Are False. PLOS Medicine, 2(8), e124. 
doi: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124 
Jackson, I., & Sirois, S. (2009). Infant cognition: Going full factorial with pupil dilation. Developmental 
Do infants understand false beliefs? 
 15 
Science, 12(4), 670–679. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00805.x 
Köster, M., Ohmer, X., Nguyen, T. D., & Kärtner, J. (2016). Infants understand others’ needs. 
Psychological Science, 27(4), 542–548. doi:10.1177/0956797615627426 
Kovács, A.M., Téglás, E., & Endress, A.D. (2010). The social sense: Susceptibility to others’ beliefs in 
human infants and adults. Science, 330 (6012), 1830–1834. doi:10.1126/science.1190792 
Kulke, L., Reiß, M., Krist, H., & Rakoczy, H. (2018). How robust are anticipatory looking measures of 
Theory of Mind? Replication attempts across the life span. Cognitive Development, 46, 97–111. 
doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2017.09.001 
Kulke, L., von Duhn, B., Schneider, D., & Rakoczy, H. (2018). Is implicit theory of mind a real and robust 
phenomenon? Results from a systematic replication study. Psychological Science, 29(6), 888-900. 
doi:10.1177/0956797617747090 
Kulke, L., & Rakoczy, H. (2018). Implicit Theory of Mind – An overview of current replications and non-
replications. Data in Brief, 16, 101–104. doi:10.1016/j.dib.2017.11.016 
Low, J., & Edwards, K. (2018). The curious case of adults’ interpretations of violation-of-expectation 
false belief scenarios. Cognitive Development, 46, 86–96. doi: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2017.07.004 
Low, J., & Watts, J. (2013). Attributing False Beliefs About Object Identity Reveals a Signature Blind 
Spot in Humans’ Efficient Mind-Reading System. Psychological Science, 24(3), 305-311. doi: 
10.1177/0956797612451469 
Mellers, B., Hertwig, R., & Kahneman, D. (2001). Do frequency representations eliminate conjunction 
effects? An exercise in adversarial collaboration. Psychological Science, 12(4), 269–275. 
doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00350 
Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs? Science, 
308(5719), 255–258. doi: 10.1126/science.1107621 
Perner, J., & Roessler, J. (2012). From infants’ to children's appreciation of belief. Trends in cognitive 
sciences, 16(10), 519–525. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.08.004 
Phillips, J., Ong, D. C., Surtees, A. D. R., Xin, Y., Williams, S., Saxe, R., & Frank, M. C. (2015). A Second 
Look at Automatic Theory of Mind. Psychological Science, 26(9), 1353-1367. doi: 
10.1177/0956797614558717 
Poulin-Dubois, D., & Chow, V. (2009). The effect of a looker’s past reliability on infants’ reasoning about 
beliefs. Developmental Psychology, 45(6), 1576–1582. doi:10.1037/a0016715 
Poulin-Dubois, D., & Yott, J. (2017). Probing the depth of infants’ theory of mind: Disunity in 
performance across paradigms. Developmental science, 21(4). Advanced online publication. 
doi:10.1111/desc.12600 
Powell, L. J., Hobbs, K., Bardis, A., Carey, S., & Saxe, R. (2018). Replications of implicit theory of mind 
tasks with varying representational demands. Cognitive Development, 46, 40–50. 
doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2017.10.004 
Priewasser, B., Rafetseder, E., Gargitter, C., & Perner, J. (2018). Helping as an early indicator of a theory 
of mind: Mentalism or Teleology? Cognitive Development, 46, 69–78. 
doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2017.08.002 
Rubio-Fernández, P. (in press). Publication standards in infancy research: Three ways to make 
violation-of-expectation studies more reliable. Infant Behavior & Development.  
Do infants understand false beliefs? 
 16 
Santiesteban, I., Shah, P., White, S., Bird, G., & Heyes, C. (2014). Mentalizing or submentalizing in a 
communication task? Evidence from autism and a camera control. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review.  
Schneider, D., Lam, R., Bayliss, A. P., & Dux, P. E. (2012). Cognitive load disrupts implicit theory-of-mind 
processing. Psychological science, 23(8), 842–847. doi:10.1177/0956797612439070 
Schuwerk, T., Priewasser, B., Sodian, B., & Perner, J. (2018). The robustness and generalizability of 
findings on spontaneous false belief sensitivity: a replication attempt. Royal Society open 
science, 5(5), 172273. doi:10.1098/rsos.172273 
Scott, R. M., & Baillargeon, R. (2017). Early False-Belief Understanding. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 21 
(4), 237–249. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2017.01.012 
Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2011). False-Positive Psychology:Undisclosed Flexibility 
in Data Collection and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as Significant. Psychological 
Science, 22(11), 1359-1366. doi: 10.1177/0956797611417632 
Slaughter, V. (2018). Neonatal imitation: Does it exist? Paper presented at the Asia-Pacific BabyLab 
Constellation Conference Singapore.  
Southgate, V., Senju, A., & Csibra, G. (2007). Action anticipation through attribution of false belief by 
2-year-olds. Psychological Science, 18(7), 587–592. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.x 
Spinrad, T. L., & Stifter, C. A. (2006). Toddlers' empathy-related responding to distress: Predictions 
from negative emotionality and maternal behavior in infancy. Infancy, 10(2), 97–121. 
doi:10.1207/s15327078in1002_1 
Surian, L., & Geraci, A. (2012). Where will the triangle look for it? Attributing false beliefs to a geometric 
shape at 17 months. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 30(1), 30–44. 
doi:10.1111/j.2044-835X.2011.02046.x 
Träuble, B., Marinović, V., & Pauen, S. (2010). Early theory of mind competencies: Do infants 
understand others’ beliefs? Infancy, 15(4), 434–444. doi:10.1111/j.1532-7078.2009.00025.x 
Wang, L., & Leslie, A. M. (2016). Is Implicit Theory of Mind the ‘Real Deal’? The Own-Belief/True-Belief 
Default in Adults and Young Preschoolers. Mind & Language, 31(2), 147–176. 
doi:10.1111/mila.12099 
Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of 
wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. Cognition, 13(1), 103–128. 
doi:10.1016/0010-0277(83)90004-5 
Xu, F., Carey, S., & Welch, J. (1999). Infants' ability to use object kind information for object 
individuation. Cognition, 70 (2), 137–166. doi:10.1016/S0010-0277(99)00007-4 
Yeung, H. H., Denison, S., & Johnson, S. P. (2016). Infants’ looking to surprising events: When eye-
tracking reveals more than looking time. Plos One, 11(12), e0164277. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164277 
Yott, J., & Poulin-Dubois, D. (2012). Breaking the rules: Do infants have a true understanding of false 

















More specific and detailed responses to more specific issues in BBS’s comment 
  
Do infants understand false beliefs? 
 18 
Appendix A: How to interpret the VoE data by Dörrenberg et al. (2018) 
Written by Sebastian Dörrenberg, Hannes Rakoczy & Ulf Liszkowski 
 
In their section on negative findings with violation-of-expectation (VoE) false belief tasks ( 
paragraph 2.1.4.), BBS report re-analyses of our findings from a conceptual VoE replication 
(Dörrenberg, Rakoczy, & Liszkowski, 2018; Anticipation + Outcome task). Here we clarify that (1) BBS 
used an arbitrary, unjustified time window for their re-analyses of our data, and (2) did not analyze the 
full set of data which we provided to her.  
 BBS correctly remark that we did not use an infant-controlled method of ending the test trial 
when children looked away for two consecutive seconds. Instead, we accumulated looking time over 
the whole outcome phase (7 seconds with reaching movement of agent, and 20 seconds with still 
frame of agent with hand in box). However, the length of our outcome phase was not a randomly 
chosen time interval, but based on literature review. That is, in most relevant VoE studies, looking time 
measurement starts after the actor remains still, and children then typically watch incongruent test 
trials for 15 to 25 seconds (or even longer, up to about 50 seconds) before they look away for two 
consecutive seconds (e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Scott, 2017; Scott, Richman, & Baillargeon, 2015; 
Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007; Träuble, Marinović, & Pauen, 2010; Woodward, 1998). Therefore, we 
chose an adequate but moderate still phase length of 20 seconds, assuming to get neither ceiling nor 
floor effects in cumulative looking time (which we did not get). BBS’s concern that condition 
differences “dissipate” after a too long test time window, while principally correct, thus does not apply 
to our design. This is also apparent from our data. 
 BBS analyzed the first 10 seconds of the still phase. Why not the first 8, 11, or 13 seconds? 
From the spread-sheet of BBS’s re-analyses we gathered that differences were calculated for looking 
times in congruent and incongruent trials for each two-second-bin of the outcome phase. This data-
driven “initial inspection” (p. 114) might be a method of choice when one is in the dark about the 
timing of an effect, but it appears to us less than ideal when one knows about the typical time window 
of the effect (which is around 20 seconds), and even less ideal when one can actually check in the data 
whether infants likely looked away for 2 seconds after 10 seconds had elapsed. Given the two-second-
bin data structure, we checked whether across two two-second-bins infants looked away for at least 2 
seconds. On this conservative estimate (because the 2 seconds needed not be consecutive), more than 
half of the children (at least 54% in incongruent as well as in congruent trials) had not looked away for 
2 seconds after the first 10 seconds of the still phase, and indeed kept looking much longer into the 
second 10 seconds period. Thus, splitting the still phase in two halves and only analyzing the first ten 
seconds is not just arbitrary, it also conflicts with the standard VoE method of ending a trial only when 
children look away for two consecutive seconds. It is this post-hoc approach that bears the danger of 
subsequent replication failures.  
 Still, if one accepts BBS’s analyses, there is a looking time difference between incongruent and 
congruent false belief-based action processing in the first 10 seconds of the still phase, which we can 
confirm. However, the analysis does not present the full picture, since BBS analyzed only the false 
belief condition. Looking time data in VoE false belief tasks must be compared to true belief control 
conditions (e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Träuble et al., 2010) to rule out low-level explanation such 
as, for instance, heightened attention due to the agent reaching into the full container (unexpected in 
FB, but expected in TB). Thus, an effect in only one of these two conditions speaks against a high-level 
interpretation such as false belief processing. Note that BBS claim in their comment that the true belief 
condition is “a simple problem ... under high processing demands” compared to the false belief 
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condition that is a “harder problem ... under the same demands” (p. 114), making it more likely -in their 
view- that children pass true belief than false belief conditions. 
BBS found that “children were much more attentive overall in the first 10 s of the still phase (M 
= 7.26, SD=2.68) than in the second 10 s of the still phase (M = 4.71, SD=2.31), F(1, 25)=46.23, p<.0001” 
(p. 114). This finding does also apply to the true belief condition, where children were more attentive 
in the first half compared to the second half of the still phase (F(1, 25)=15.89, p=.001). This seems to 
be what would be expected in VoE tasks, i.e. attention decreases over time until children finally look 
away for two consecutive seconds. Maybe this pattern could also be found in other VoE studies, e.g. 
in that of Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) if cumulative looking time was analyzed. Baillargeon further 
found in her re-analysis “that children looked significantly longer at the unexpected event (M = 14.12 
s, SD=3.74) than at the expected event (M = 12.41, SD=5.55) overall, F(1, 24)=5.97, p=.022” (p. 114). 
The corresponding analysis on the true belief condition, however, shows that children’s looking time 
at the unexpected event (M=13.04, SD=4.00) was not different from looking time at the expected event 
(M=13.00, SD=3.66) overall (F(1, 25)=0.00, p=.963). BBS further reported that “19/26 children showed 
this effect, p=0.014 (cumulative binomial probability), including 8/10, or 80%, who saw the unexpected 
event first, and 11/16, or 69%, who saw the expected event first” (p. 114). Again, the corresponding 
analysis on the true belief condition needs to be reported to complement the picture. Here, only 14/26 
(54%) children looked longer at the unexpected event (binomial test, p=.423, one-tailed), 7/12 (58%) 
who saw the unexpected event first, and 7/14 (50%) who saw the expected event first.  
To provide the omnibus test of our analyses on the data of both conditions, now without the 
last 10 seconds of the outcome phase, a 2x2x2 ANOVA with congruency (incongruent, congruent) as 
within-subject factor, order (incongruent first, congruent first) and condition (TB, FB) as between-
subject factors revealed a pattern that resembled our initially reported findings. There was a significant 
effect for congruency (F(1, 48)=4.03, p=.050, ηp2=0.077), a marginally significant interaction between 
congruency and order (F(1, 48)=3.86, p=.055, ηp2=0.074), and congruency tended to interact with 
condition (F(1, 48)=3.05, p=.087, ηp2=0.060). Testing our hypotheses for each condition separately, we 
found that in the FB condition infants looked longer during incongruent trials when the incongruent 
trial was presented first (F(1, 24)=5.17, p=.032, ηp2=0.177), but not when the congruent trial was 
presented first (F(1, 24)=1.73, p=.202, ηp2=0.067). Crucially, in contrast to our original analyses on the 
whole outcome phase, there were no effects in the TB condition (all ps>.182).  
In our original analyses we were careful to report first trial between-subject analyses because 
the Onishi & Baillargeon (2005) study was a between-subject study (see also BBS’s concerns about 
contamination and order effects). BBS did not report that ‘replication’ analysis. When we ran the first 
trial between-subject analysis without the last 10 seconds of the outcome phase, there were no 
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Appendix B: How to interpret validation studies on VoE stimuli with adults 
Written by Jason Low & Katheryn Edwards 
 
Low and Edwards (2018) found that adults perceived the event sequence of Onishi and Baillargeon’s 
(2005) object-location violation-of-expectation (VOE) scenario to be meaningful. However, regardless 
of whether or not adults were told to track beliefs, participants found Scott and Baillargeon’s (2009) 
object-identity VOE scenario difficult to interpret. Contrary to what has been reported of infants’ 
responses, adults judged the unexpected outcome of Scott and Baillargeon’s VOE scenario as being 
expected, explaining that it was sensible for the agent to reach first towards the penguin toy which 
was visible. Baillargeon, Buttelmann and Southgate (2018) raised two criticisms. 
 
First, Baillargeon et al. (2018) claimed that adults judged the ending where the agent reached for the 
transparent cover as being expected because participants interpreted both penguin toys as being 
“interchangeable containers with removable lids”. They claimed that if the event involved 
interchangeable objects, there would be “less mental effort” for adults to conclude that the agent will 
reach for the object that was visible to him. It is not clear, however, what it is about that VOE event 
context that would lead adults—but not infants—to base expectations on simple relational states that 
require less mental effort. The toy penguins Low and Edwards (2018) used were not designed as 
containers with lids, and the researchers even ensured that the objects afforded distinct construals 
(the 1-piece penguin was held by its top when moved and the 2-piece penguin was moved in pieces). 
Baillargeon et al. revealed that the components of the 2-piece toy in Scott and Baillargeon’s study 
“were not akin to empty containers with lids (e.g., the two pieces of the 2-piece penguin were more 
like the two halves of a grapefruit), so infants might have perceived the penguins as novel toys and not 
brought to bear their budding knowledge about containers and lids”. There are two ways to frame 
Baillargeon et al.’s dismissal of Low and Edwards’ choice of penguin toys. On the less positive side, if 
the VOE effect is an artefact of the penguin toy merely needing to look more like a grapefruit instead 
of a lidded-container, then researchers will need to be even more skeptical about the claim that an 
abstract understanding of false-beliefs about object identity develops early in life. On the more positive 
side, Baillargeon et al.’s dismissal could turn out to be an unexpected victory for Low and Edwards’ 
study in raising attention to a promissory boundary condition that could modulate perception of 
outcomes in the penguin VOE paradigm. A direction for future research might be to manipulate the 
two penguin toys’ spatial cavities to determine whether and to what extent infants would even track 
beliefs involving both features and locations of the two toys (e.g., the stacked 2-piece penguin that 
affords containment is in the transparent box). Future research could test whether infants’ belief 
reasoning would show signature limits in these or similar ways.  
 
Second, Baillargeon et al. (2018) dismissed Low and Edwards’ (2018) approach and findings as being 
relevant to understanding infants’ responses to VOE false-belief scenarios because adults have 
“greater knowledge, experience and reasoning capacity”. Baillargeon et al. missed the message of the 
study. Cognitive-developmental scientists have found it useful to gather converging data across 
different age groups and populations because similarities and/or differences in response profiles that 
persist over vast differences in experiences can illuminate how tasks are being interpreted and, further, 
help characterize diverse mental models of the psychological and physical worlds that influence human 
beings’ attention and action (e.g., Dixson, Komugabe-Dixson, Dixson, & Low, 2017; Hinten, 
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Labuschagne, Boden, & Scarf, 2018; Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010; Xu, Carey, & Welch, 1999). In lieu 
of data, researchers often assume how mature mindreaders would behave when faced with highly 
complex VOE paradigms and then discuss infants’ looking expectations as if actual data of people’s 
interpretations existed (see also Silva, Ten Hope, & Tucker, 2014). The popular assumption is that the 
penguin VOE study showcases infants’ ascriptions of false-beliefs about object identity; however, the 
set-up could just as well be processed by tracking false-beliefs about object types (Butterfill & Apperly, 
2013). Without converging data from adults, the field is mired in an unending debate about the 
meaning of Scott and Baillargeon’s VOE paradigm. Low and Edwards’ findings are therefore relevant: 
Even amongst adults who did interpret the expected outcome as being expected, the explanations 
revolved around the agent making a decision based on the types of object present rather than on 
object identity in the strict numerical sense. The findings give researchers a starting point for 
delineating infants’ processing of the psychological world that could support tracking false-beliefs in a 
limited but useful range of situations.  
 
Overall, given that adults find it challenging to interpret VOE false-belief scenarios, researchers should 
take seriously how extremely challenging it can be to constrain which aspects of a situation may be 
deemed relevant when interpreting an agent’s belief-based behaviour. The main message from Low 
and Edwards (2018) is clear: Future VOE studies of false-belief understanding should at least seek 
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Appendix C: How to interpret helping False Belief tasks?  
written by Josef Perner, Beate Priewasser & Eva Rafetseder 
 
In order to not get embroiled too deeply in the very specific but often undeterminable issues we try to 
make our general research logic explicit and arrive at three points, which have to be addressed by any 
successful objections.  
Aims of our study:   
 (1)  Replicate the findings of BCT in Experiment 1 
(2)  Investigate whether representation of the agent’s false belief is necessary for more 
frequent target (box B directed) responses in the FB than the TB condition in Experiment 2. 
(3) Make a case for children’s use of teleology. 
Aim 1  Replication 
Despite a comparatively small sample size we managed (though barely) to replicate the finding in its 
essential feature, which is the difference in target responses between conditions, indispensable for 
claiming that children are sensitive to the agent’s belief. 
The difference was not replicated in the old conditions of Experiment 2, plausibly due to the even 
smaller sample size and an increased error rate due to the middle object distraction. Nevertheless the 
results do not differ from the results of Experiment 1. Hence there is no reliable evidence that the 
effect could not be obtained with three boxes. 
Aim 2 Mentalism 
The, most central point of our investigation was to determine whether BCT’s results establish the 
mentalist claim that infants adjust their intentional (helping) actions to an agent’s false belief. To 
restate our conclusion that their results do not achieve their aim it helps to reflect explicitly on our 
research strategy. 
 In general, to show that children of a certain age possess a certain target ability we need to 
show that they display a certain target response that could not be displayed unless they possessed the 
ability in question. To convincingly claim that the target ability is necessary for the target response and 
that the response could not arise for different reasons, control conditions are needed. Control 
conditions should ideally be the same as the experimental condition except, of course, for lack of those 
features that are needed to make the target ability indispensable for the target response to emerge. 
If the target response occurs more frequently in the experimental than the control conditions one has 
grounds to claim that children possess this ability. This is classical experimental practice.   
In particular, Buttelmann, Carpenter, and Tomasello, et al. (2009: BCT) looked for children’s 
ability to ascribe a false belief to an agent. They contrasted two conditions, each of which consisted of 
a manipulation and an action phase. In the manipulation phase of both conditions an agent played 
with a toy and then put it inside one (box A) of two boxes. For the false belief (FB) condition the 
manipulation consisted of having the agent leave the room, while the toy was being transferred to box 
B, and have him return afterwards. In the true belief (TB) condition the agent saw the object being 
transferred, then he briefly walked away, and returned. The action phase was the same in both 
conditions: upon his return the agent approached the empty box A and tried to open it. The child, who 
was familiar with the locking mechanism, was asked to help. The majority of children in the TB 
condition helped the agent with opening the empty box, while in the FB condition they helpfully 
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directed the agent to the toy’s new location. BCT claim that directing the agent to box B more often in 
the FB than in the TB condition (let us call it the target effect) comes about because (some) children 
have taken the agent’s false belief into account. This is a sensible claim from a mentalist’s point of view 
since an agent trying to open a box, where he thinks an interesting toy is, gives a strong indication that 
he is looking for the toy. The helpful children will, therefore, redirect him to the toy’s new location.  
To maintain BCT’s mentalist claim we need to be able to infer from the presence of the target 
effect the target ability, which is to take the agent’s belief into account. This is possible, given the 
context of the experiment, only if other reasons for the target effect can be excluded. In our 
Experiment 2 we checked whether the target effect still obtains when the action relevance of the belief 
is neutralized, by having the agent open a box in both conditions, which he knows to be empty. This 
leaves the child without a clue that the agent is looking for the toy. Hence children’s tendency to help 
by directing the agent to the toy’s location in the FB condition should not be different from the TB 
condition. If the target effect should still show up despite these measures then it could not be 
connected to children attending to the agent’s belief.  
To implement this strategy we used three boxes instead of two as in BCT. Otherwise the 
manipulations for creating the true and the false belief were left identical to the original. In the action 
phase, however, the agent tried open the third box C (new conditions), known to be empty, instead of 
box A, where he put his toy initially. The results taken from Priewasser et al (2018, Table 3) are shown 
in the bottom two rows of Table 1. The data show clearly that children in the new FB condition still 
respond with the target behavior (directing the agent to box B) more often than in the new TB 
condition. The results are also similar to our replication of the original 2-box conditions of Experiment 
1 (first two rows in Table 1). The comparability is also shown by the odds ratios of similar magnitude 
(last column) and the fact that a cross experiment comparison was not significant (χ2(3) = .44, p = .93). 
This result implies that under the conditions of the 3-box experiment the target effect can be obtained 
even when the action relevance of the agent’s belief has been muted. Hence, some other factors than 
consideration of the agent’s action relevant belief must have been responsible for the target effect. 
 
The next question is whether these alternative factors were also responsible for producing the 
target effect in BCT’s 2-box study. Since the manipulations used to produce the beliefs were the same 
in the two experiments it seems very plausible that the same alternative factors were active in both 
studies. Hence we cannot infer from the presence of the target effect in these studies that infants must 
have represented the agent’s belief. Consequently, BCT’s study fails to demonstrate an early sensitivity 
to belief. This conclusion can be avoided if we can show—or plausibly argue—for one of three 
Table 1. Number of children’s responses directed at one of two or three boxes  
              (data from Tables 2 and 3 of Priewasser et al (2018) 
Condition 
Agent tries  
to open 













FB Box now 
empty 
1 13 n.a. 14 
9.75 
TB 6 8 n.a. 14 
New 
3 boxes 
FB Box always 
empty 
6 18 2 26 
7.87 
TB 12 8 7 27 
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possibilities: (1) the use of three boxes instead of two created a difference between conditions in the 
three box version that was not part of the 2 box original. The agent’s trying to open the hitherto 
untouched box C (2) produced the target effect or (3) left the agent’s belief relevant for his action. We 
find it difficult to come up with plausible arguments for any of the three possibilities. Fortunately, in 
their commentaries Baillargeon, Buttelmann, and Southgate (2018) and Jacob (2018a,b), who the 
former cite, made pertinent claims.  
Baillargeon, et al. mention four possible features of the 3-box study thought to invalidate our 
conclusion. (i) The greater complexity of the 3-box study provided “more features to process for 
participants, which might have influenced the results.” (ii) The third box created a tendency to respond 
with the centre box. (iii) Use of participants from different countries and different testing 
environments leaves it unclear which factor led to fewer box A responses than in the original BCT study. 
(iv) Since “children’s attention was never directed towards the “always empty” box [C] …, it remains 
unclear whether it was unambiguous to participants how the agent represented the content of this 
third box.” We find it difficult to see how increased complexity, the attraction of the centre box, or the 
participation of children from different countries could have (re 1) created a difference between the 
conditions that wasn’t present in the 2 box version, (re 2) could make the agent’s search in box C create 
the target effect, or (re 3) left the action relevance of the agent’s belief intact. This is our principled 
defense for why the commentators’ objections do not affect the validity of our conclusion. In addition 
we can back up our defense with specific answers.  
In (i) the commentators argue that the added third box in Experiment 2 increased the 
processing load and any interpretation of the observed behaviour cannot be applied to the original 
experiment. In support of their argument they highlight that in the ‘old’ conditions of Experiment 2 
(the agent searches in box A) responses in the TB and the FB conditions should have differed 
significantly. Although this was not found, response frequencies of the old conditions in Experiment 2 
closely mirrored those of Experiment 1 (as outlined above). Moreover, and relevant to argument (ii), 
children practically ignored the added box as a response option those conditions (only one child chose 
that box), indicating a systematic choice behaviour rather than processing overload (which would have 
most likely produced chance behaviour). In (iii) the commentators argue that use of participants from 
different countries and different testing environments could have undermined replication efforts in 
our Experiment 1. Since replication only failed for the TB (but not the FB) condition, it remains to be 
explained, why these factors affected conditions selectively. They further argued (iv) that children’s 
attention was never directed to box C which could have led children to be uncertain about how the 
agent represented the content of that box. If this was indeed the case, one would predict this 
ambiguity to affect both new conditions FB and TB in a similar fashion. This would mean that, under 
the mentalistic approach, no difference was expected, a prediction not confirmed in our data.  
Unfolding their arguments Baillargeon, et al., repeatedly allude to the relatively small sample 
size in our studies and that this would have weakened our conclusions. Although small sample sizes 
are a good argument against failures to replicate, i.e., fail to achieve significant results due to lack of 
power, it does not invalidate the significant target effect in the 3-box study, on which our conclusions 
are based. Furthermore, the fact that our children showed less help with box A (Experiment 1) or box 
C (Experiment 2) in the TB conditions than in the original study does not invalidate our conclusion. For, 
we still find the target effect of a significant difference between box B responses in the FB and in the 
TB condition.  
Jacob (2018a) raised–under the heading of “refutation of the mentalistic interpretation”–
several further objections:  
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(v) “I see no convincing reason why the mentalistic prediction should accept the burden of 
assuming that children in the new FB condition should behave as they did in the old5 TB condition.”  
Since our results show that there are other reasons for the target effect operative in our 3-box version 
than the agent’s false belief, these reasons could not have been miraculously absent in the original 2-
box study, unless one can argue that the changes caused by introducing the third box and the choice 
of box C by the agent could have invalidated these reasons. Reassuringly, Jacob did seem to accept the 
burden after all by listing three further objections: 
(vi) “When the agent unsuccessfully tries to open box A while knowing that her toy is in box B, 
young children may assume that she has some reason or other for trying to open box A based on 
her prior selection of box A over box B for placing her toy, although they do not know her reason. 
By contrast, in the new FB condition, when the mistaken agent tries unsuccessfully to open box C, 
children cannot draw on the fact that the agent earlier placed her toy in box A (not C), in order to 
infer that the agent must have some unknown reason to deal with box C.”  
This argument does not strike us as very self-evident. One obvious reason for going to an empty box, 
be it A or C, would be to retrieve the toy but having forgotten where it was, or to place a new object 
into an empty box. It is not apparent why such obvious reasons could not be found if the empty box is 
used for the first time.  
(vii) “In light of the second difference between the old TB and the new FB condition, the mentalistic 
account is likely to predict that the children will be baffled by the fact that the agent’s attempt at 
opening box C cannot be justified by her false belief that her toy is in box A (as the agent’s action 
was in the old FB condition). They will also be more baffled by the agent’s action in the new FB 
condition than by the agent’s action in the old TB condition. In light of the fact that in the new FB 
condition (but not in the old TB condition), the agent holds a false belief about her toy’s location 
and is also naturally construed as eager to find the toy that she owns, the children are likely to 
reason that if their goal is to help the agent, then the most efficient means at their disposal is to 
provide her with her toy (about whose location she has a false belief).” 
If we understand the mentalistic predictions correctly, the account would also predict children to help 
more often in the old FB condition, where the agent tries to open the box where he thinks the toy is, 
than in the new FB condition, where he tries to open box C, known to be empty. Table 3 in Priewasser 
et al (2018) however shows no trace of that: 63% B-responses in the old FB condition and 69% in the 
new FB condition. 
To end, we indulge in the unnecessary luxury of speculating about the definitive causes of the 
target effect despite our insistence that we do not need to be specific for our argument: Our results 
demand the existence of an alternative cause of the target effect in the 3-box study and it is hard to 
see how this cause could not also be operative in the original 2-box procedure. Priewasser et al (2018) 
and Allen (2015) identified three ways in which conditions differed in the manipulation phase: (a) The 
agent shows clear interest in the toy, (b) the toy seems to belong to the agent, and (c) the toy is 
transferred under secrecy triggering a hide and seek schema in the FB conditions but not (or less so) 
in the TB conditions.  
The structural analysis of our research strategy, expanded above, made us aware of a fourth 
very plausible difference that might, to some degree, also appeal to mentalists. (d) Although the 
 
5 We suspect he meant the original 2-box condition, although we used “old-TB” in the 3-box version of 
Experiment 2 in which the agent tried to open box A, as in the original, instead of box C as in the new-TB 
condition. 
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agent’s attempt to open box C instead of A in the new FB condition does cancel the action relevance 
of his false belief, it does not cancel the relevance of his ignorance of the toy’s actual location as action 
relevant: Someone who knows does not need help; someone who fails to know needs help. 
Importantly, this difference does not help establish the mentalist account that children’s helping shows 
their ability to represent the agent’s false belief. Moreover, although the distinction between 
knowledge and ignorance suggests some mentalist competence, it does not amount to the ability to 
represent propositional attitudes, and can also be claimed by teleology, to which we now turn. 
Aim 3 Teleology 
Since we could show that the response pattern in BCT and our replication was not based on children’s 
mentalising we wondered whether teleology would suffice to account for it. The commentators and 
also Jacob (2018) raised objections against Allen’s (2016) and our intuition that the conspiratorial cue 
in the FB condition suggested a hide and seek routine to children. Although we once used the term 
sneakily and spoke of playing a trick we did not mean to suggest that children understood this as acts 
of deception (as interpreted by Jacob 2018) but simply as a cue to a hide and seek scenario. Children 
this age experience such a scenario as something where one “hides” (without understanding to 
suppress all cues to where that is) and then waits until the seeker looks in a different place before 
being successful. After his first visit to an empty place the children already giggle audibly and often 
help the seeker to find them. Playing hide and seek in the FB condition, the agent’s attempt to look 
inside the empty box A conforms to the first step in such a scenario followed by helpful cues to where 
the object really is. The commentators correctly pointed out that in a false belief task such 
conspiratorial cues increase the likelihood of predicting that the agent will look in the empty place. 
This, however, does not contradict our application in BCT’s helping task, where the agent has already 
tried to look in the wrong place and children subsequently try to help correct his error. 
 In our defense against our commentators above we pointed out that the agent’s attempt to 
open box C in the new 3-box conditions made the agent’s belief irrelevant for explaining his attempt, 
but it did not make his ignorance about the location irrelevant. So mentalists can claim that the results 
may show the involvement of infants understanding of some psychological states like knowledge. In 
relation to teleology it is important to state that the behavioral impact of certain psychological states 
does not require an understanding of these states as propositional attitudes. For instance intention 
action can be understood as action for a good reason (Anscombe 1957; Perner & Roessler, 2010) and 
knowledge can be understood as a relation between the agent and the event of which he has or does 
not have knowledge (AGENT knows/does not know EVENT). And knowledge of the relevant facts can 
be seen as an enabling condition for intentional action. This contrasts with false belief, because one 
cannot relate an agent to a non-existing event. Instead, one has to conceive of the belief’s content as 
a proposition, i.e., the agent believes that the event has happened.  
 
 
 
